In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle examines a fundamental topic in philosophy–human happiness. Many philosophers have questioned what it is that makes a human life worthwhile. Some propose that fulfillment and happiness comes from a utilitarian maximization of pleasure, or a drive for personal and political power, or contemplation of the fundamental questions of the world. To answer this question rather, Aristotle forwards a view based on a metaphysical analysis of the human form. In his view, the best life comes from living in eudaimonia, meaning happiness or wellbeing. That which is achieved by living in accordance with our virtues–a set of character traits and dispositions that arise from the human form. While this view of human happiness as life in eudaimonia as a realization of our form certainly has some truth to it, it does not provide a full account of human fulfillment.
Aristotle’s position on human happiness is first based in our form and the virtues he derives from it. To Aristotle a human being is the composite of its form and material which can be observed by watching the process of the thing being-at-work-staying-itself. (Aristotle, On the Soul, II.1). This process, of a human being-at-work-staying-itself, is from what he derives virtues. To Aristotle, there are certain traits which are beneficial and detrimental to a human’s ability to do so. For example, an addiction to heroin would prevent a human from doing humant hings, and as such prevent them from realizing the human form. On the other hand, traits like temperance that would prevent one from falling into such addiction, would further their ability torealize the form of a human. From these observations, a common set of virtues or character traits that allow one to better realize the human form, can be derived. (NE I 7-9)
According to Aristotle, these virtues are given to us by our socialization, and must be reinforced through our will and self control as we live our lives. As such, there are multiple different relationships one could have to their virtues. In the first, one has virtuous inclinations, but does not have the will to restrain themselves from the temptations of vicious conduct when it arises. In the second, a person has vicious temptations and tendencies, but has the will power to control themselves when they are tempted. In the third, a person simply has no will, and follows their temptations where they lead, ultimately being without control of themselves. In the fourth, a person has control over their will, but lacks virtuous inclinations. Their conduct is in control but not guided by any feelings of the necessity of virtuous conduct. Finally, the fifth and most desirable disposition is that of one in Eudaimonia, to both have control over your will and act virtuously without vicious temptation. It is through this disposition that Aristotle believes that true happiness is achieved. (NE VII 7-10)
This view of happiness is certainly defensible both under his own metaphysical principles and in many practical examples. Since the realization of the human form is the act of a human being-at-work-staying-itself, Aristotle's virtues that allow for one to best do so, would lead to the best fulfillment of that form. Furthermore, the lack of temptation to behave otherwise would assist as well, as virtuous conduct that is acted out as the right behavior for the right reasons prevents such conduct coming at the expense of a denial of the self and one’s base urges.
On a more practical matter, behaving courageously when it is right to be courageous, with temperance when it is right to be temperate, and with generosity when it is appropriate to be generous is clearly beneficial to one’s ability to live a good life. If one lacks these characteristics, they may fall into negative behavior patterns or harm those that make their lives better. A lack of courage can leave one stuck in fearful inaction while a excess of it can lead to reckless injury or harm, an excess of temperance may lead to a denial of any of the worthy pleasures of life while an excess can lead to spiraling addiction, and a lack of generosity can lead to selfishness that drives off those around us while an excess can leave us open to exploitation. From these examples, it seems clear that life in accordance with virtue certainly allows us to best be humans at-work-being-ourselves.
However, while life does require some degree of virtue to avoid the severe negative consequences of extreme vicious conduct, it is not clear that life lived solely in virtuous conduct is the ultimate standard of human fulfillment. Consider the individual who Aristotle makes out to be most desirable, he who behaves virtuously without temptation or denial of his base instinct. While his life seems like it holds benefits over those who sometimes engage in vicious conduct, it cannot be said that his life is more full than his less high minded peers. His life would seem to be rather boring, he goes to his job, puts in his fullest effort and enjoys himself, goes home and spends time with his wife and kids, perhaps practicing a skill he’s learning or a hobby he’s mastered. While certainly a good life, it seems rather drab, devoid of some of the experiences that make our lives worth living.
However, the answer to this drabness of the virtuous man’s life is not to throw virtue out of the window. The man who lives only according to a will without virtue will quickly enter a manic cycle of indulgence. He will fall victim to his worst traits, likely ending up alienating himself from his friends and family, addicted to various quick pleasures, behind bars, or possibly dead. Instead, there is an alternative character who presents a view of a more fulfilling existence: the rebel or the petty thief, who engages in mostly harmless buckings of virtue. She has vicious instincts but nothing horrifying. Perhaps she steals a candy bar from time to time, or gambles a bit more than she really should, or steals a jacket from her brother. Other than these rare occasions, she lives a life of virtue, seeks to be good to those around her, and adheres to the principles she holds. There is a certain childlike joy to rebelling from time to time, and so long as its harm to others is minimal and results in no major, freedom-inhibiting consequence, her life will certainly be fuller than that of the comparatively neutered virtuous man.
Perhaps it could be argued that this woman’s vicious indiscretions themselves are hedonistic and pleasure-chasing, and that the virtuous man feels his life no less full for their absence. Yet, there is a distinct life affirming joy to them, a small act of harmless rebellion against some of the omnipresent indignities of life. They are a reassertion of one's freedom, an expression of the joy that comes from exercising them, and a full embrace of the entirety of one's character. It is a small, inconsequential yet invaluable way of asking the world to “Behold the Man.” It is these acts of affirmation of one’s own humanity against a repressive world that Aristotle’s formulation of ethics fails to capture.
While on the whole, primarily virtuous conduct seems to be a good starting point and a likely precondition for happiness, it does not cover all of the possible life affirming joys a human can experience. To end with a short aphorism: to lust for life, one must have within them the capacity for moments of vice.